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LITIGATION CAMPAIGNS AND THE SEARCH FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL RULES
Mark V. Tushnet*
This Journal's focus on appellate practice and procedure
suggests that it might be appropriate and productive to take a
somewhat unusual approach to Brown' and its significance.
Brown was most important, of course, for its role in the
transformation of American race relations. From the point of
view of the appellate courts, Brown is significant in another
way. Brown was the culmination of a sustained campaign of2
strategically designed litigation-or so it came to be thought.
Lawyers subsequently took the strategic litigation campaign
they saw ending in the triumph of Brown as a model for their
own causes, and developed strategies to use litigation in the
service of a wide range of causes: women's rights, prison
reform, abolition of capital punishment, protection of property
rights, and the undermining of affirmative action, among
others. 3 In each of these campaigns, the lawyers of course
sought favorable rulings from appellate courts. But-and this is
my primary point-they typically sought favorable rulings of a
particulartype. In general, the ultimate goal was a simple and
easily understood rule, parallel to the rule condemning state laws
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center.
1. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U. S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Bd of Educ., 349 U.S.
294 (1955).
2. My analysis of the litigation campaign concludes that the NAACP's litigation
campaign is best understood as more catch-as-catch-can than as the systematic pursuit of a
plan set forth in advance, but that in retrospect lawyers both within and outside the
NAACP did reconstruct the litigation as the execution of a strategic plan. See generally
Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP"s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925-1950
(U.N.C. Press 1987), on which much of what follows draws.
3. For a discussion of other aspects of the legacy of Brown for strategic litigation
(forthcoming
campaigns, see Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown, 90 Va. L. Rev. _
2004).
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mandating the separation of children by race. The reason, I
argue, is that favorable rulings that take the form of general
standards are not nearly as useful to the cause lawyers, who
typically have relatively limited resources and cannot afford to
litigate the kinds of fact-intensive cases that standards (rather
than rules) favorable to them generate.
The NAACP's litigation campaign began with cases that
sought to require school districts to take the equality component
of "separate but equal" seriously. Initially the cases involved
teachers' salaries. Some of these posed no serious litigation
challenges, as when school boards conceded that they paid
African American and white teachers different salaries because
of their race. Others presented in the small the problem that
broader equalization challenges would pose. In these more
troublesome cases-from the litigators' point of view-school
boards contended that they did not make their decisions
explicitly on the basis of race, but rather paid salaries to teachers
based on their qualifications. Penetrating that argument by
showing that black and white teachers with equivalent
qualifications got different salaries was sometimes difficult.
How, for example, could one compare a teacher with a master's
degree and five years of experience with a teacher who had no
graduate degree but twenty years of experience?
These litigation difficulties would have been immensely
compounded had the NAACP attempted to enforce "separate but
equal" with respect4 to the material conditions of elementary and
secondary schools. The lawyers would have had to make school
by school comparisons, measuring many different characteristics
of the schools: their age, the quality of their plumbing, their
athletic facilities, their science laboratories, and more. Often, of
course, the schools for African Americans would be unequal to
the schools for whites with respect to every one of these
characteristics. Sometimes, though, the litigators would have to
persuade a judge that a newer school for African Americans
without good science laboratories was unequal to an older,

4. Throughout, I refer to "the NAACP's lawyers," but technically the lawyers were
employed by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, a distinction that became
important in later years as the two organizations began to pursue somewhat different
litigation agendas.
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somewhat more run-down school for whites with better science
labs.5
In the abstract, these equalization cases could have gone
forward.6 The NAACP's litigators, though, did not have the
resources to pursue them in any systematic way. The NAACP
staff was limited, with no more than five or six lawyers available
at any one time to deal with all of the legal issues the NAACP
wanted to pursue. Further, the legal staff was located in New
York, far from the Southern districts in which the litigation
would have to be conducted. The legal staff tried to locate
lawyers in each locality who could help out in carrying the
burdens of litigation. There were few such lawyers, however, no
more than one or two-if that-in the states in the deep South.
Financial resources were as limited as human ones. Conducting
equalization lawsuits would require investigations and,
sometimes, expert testimony. The salary equalization litigation
had its greatest successes in challenging policies in Southern
cities and petered out as the NAACP's lawyers had to slog
through rural districts. Equalization lawsuits dealing with the
schools themselves would have been much worse: The most
substantial outcomes would come in the South's cities, but the
investigations and comparisons there would be the most
expensive; victories in rural areas might be easier to come by,
but the physical dangers of investigating and litigating in those
districts were substantial, and the payoffs of even successful
suits would be relatively small.
Switching from an equalization strategy to what was called
the direct attack on segregation-the effort to get a Supreme
Court decision declaring that segregation as such was
unconstitutional-made sense from the point of view of
litigators acting under severe resource constraints. 7 Later
5. This problem was compounded as the Brown litigation proceeded and some
Southern governors, notably James Byrnes of South Carolina, supported relatively large
appropriations to be dedicated to upgrading the segregated schools for African Americans.
These newer schools would have undoubtedly been better than the older schools for whites
in some respects, but worse, despite their recent construction, in others.
6. For a description of some early efforts in Virginia, which does not provide much
detail on the resource question, see Peter Wallenstein, Blue Laws and Black Codes:
Conflict, Courts, and Change in Twentieth-Century Virginia 94-96 (U. Va. Press 2004).
7. In making the observation in the text, I do not mean to suggest that the decision to
pursue the direct attack was dictated solely by resource concerns. In fact, the NAACP's
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strategic litigation campaigns had a similar structure: an initial
resource-intensive stage invoking a general standard of
constitutional law to challenge practices in particular settings,
followed by a change to a strategy of seeking a flat and easily
enforced rule that would make it clear that practices in a large
number of settings were unconstitutional.
Before sketching the way in which this structure has
characterized post-Brown litigation campaigns, I must note
another part of the story as it developed. In the most general
terms, we can call it the problem of the legally ambiguous
victory that generates a backlash, whose effect is to force the
litigators to engage in a new form of resource-intensive
litigation. Here too the story can be seen in the Brown litigation.
Brown I was ambiguous in its identification of why segregation
was unconstitutional. To use the terms that have since become
common, segregation might have been unconstitutional because
it involved a racial classification, or it might have been
unconstitutional because it constituted a system of racial
subordination.8 Judge John Parker noted the ambiguity in his
opinion on remand in the South Carolina case decided along
with Brown, writing that Brown "does not require integration...
[but] merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce
segregation." 9 The ambiguities were made even more apparent
in Brown II, the decision on remedy. There the Court said that
desegregation should proceed "with all deliberate speed," that
courts could consider "problems related to administration," but
that "the vitality of the[] constitutional principles [stated in
Brown 1] cannot be allowed to yield simply because of
disagreement with them."10 Everyone knew that mere problems
of administration could not justify any substantial delay in
implementing Brown and that the Court's real concern was
resistance predicated on "disagreement" with Brown. The

goal had always been to obtain a declaration of segregation's unconstitutionality.
Equalization litigation was an intermediate strategy, pursued on the way to the direct
attack.
8. For a recent discussion of these ambiguities, see Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk:
Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in ConstitutionalStruggles Over Brown,
117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470 (2004).
9. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
10. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300, 301.
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Court's position made most sense if Brown did indeed require
integration, but Brown never said what it did require.
These ambiguities licensed Brown's opponents to defend
extremely limited desegregation plans as entirely legal. That, in
turn, re-created the litigation problems that the NAACP's
lawyers had sought to overcome through the direct attack. Now,
instead of challenging unequal facilities district by district, the
lawyers had to challenge inadequate desegregation plans district
by district. Eventually the courts got fed up and basically shifted
the burden from the NAACP's lawyers to those representing the
districts, forcing the latter to justify any additional delays. By
that time, however, real opposition to Brown's implications for
integration had developed. Gradually Brown's admirers were
placed on the defensive. They began to win only occasional
victories, and often relatively small ones, and suffered
increasingly large defeats. At the end of the story, then, from the
litigators' point of view, they were essentially back at the
starting point, having available to them constitutional doctrines
that were favorable in the abstract but that they could not
effectively enforce because of resource constraints.
I turn now to some brief discussions of how the patterns
revealed in the litigation associated with Brown recurred as
other lawyers emulated the strategic litigation campaign they
saw there. 12 The NAACP Legal Defense Fund itself pursued a
campaign against the death penalty, believing that its
administration was racially disproportionate and therefore an
appropriate matter of concern to an organization dedicated to the
interests of African Americans.' 3 At its outset, that campaign
had two components. The first was an effort to eliminate the
availability of the death penalty in certain categories of casesnotably, rape and robbery-where its racial impact had been

11. See e.g. Green v. County Sch. Bd, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) ("The burden on a
school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work.... It
is incumbent upon the school board to establish that its proposed plan promises meaningful
and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation.").
12. I condense complicated stories here and sometimes distort the actual sequence of
events, in particular by placing in different stages events that sometimes occurred
essentially simultaneously.
13. For the story of the early stages of this litigation campaign, see Michael Meltsner,
Cruel and Unusual: The Supreme Court and CapitalPunishment (William Morrow 1974).

106
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14
most severe. These categorical challenges basically failed.
Second, the lawyers mounted challenges to the processes by
which capital punishment was administered. They challenged
the exclusion from juries of potential jurors who had principled
objections to the death penalty, arguing that the "death
qualified" juries that resulted were more likely to convict
defendants and then more likely to sentence them to death; they
challenged the instructions jurors received on the question of
sentencing defendants to death; and they sought to obtain a rule
that the jury that convicted the defendant could not go on to
consider whether the defendant should be sentenced to death.
The results of these challenges were mixed. The Supreme Court
limited the use of "death qualified" juries, 15 but did not overturn
existing procedures for instructing juries
and allowing a single
6
sentence.'
and
guilt
both
decide
to
jury
The categorical challenges were not terribly resourceintensive, although to the extent that the categorical challenges
sought to take advantage of a sense that African Americans
received death sentences more often than whites did for crimes
like rape and robbery, they did require the accumulation of some
social-scientific evidence. The other challenges were resourceintensive. The litigators had to develop significant records, not
so much about the facts of the cases themselves, but about the
social science they believed bore on their constitutional claims.
Partly because of their mixed successes in the first stage of the
litigation campaign against the death penalty, the litigators
turned to the ultimate issue, the constitutionality of capital
punishment itself. For present purposes, what is notable about
this development is that it shifted the litigation from resourceintensive challenges to litigation seeking a flat and easily
administered rule.
To the litigators' surprise, they won. 17 As with Brown, the
victory was ambiguous. The Court held that capital punishment,

14. One reached the Supreme Court, which disposed of it on other grounds. Boykin v.
Ala., 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (avoiding the determination of whether capital punishment
should be available for robbery by finding that Boykin's guilty plea was not made
voluntarily).
15. Witherspoon v. Ill., 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
16. McGautha v. Cal., 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
17. Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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as then administered, was unconstitutional because it led to the
arbitrary imposition of death sentences. That held out the
possibility that some other system of administering capital
punishment might be constitutional if decision-makers had
sufficient guidance to eliminate the arbitrariness. Chief Justice
Burger's dissenting opinion provided a road-map for legislatures
to follow. And they did. The Court then acceded to the backlash
18
by upholding capital punishment under the revised statutes.
After the restoration of capital punishment, litigation
against the death penalty again took two forms. The first was,
once again, an effort to obtain some categorical exclusions from
eligibility for death. Some of the categorical exclusions were by
crime-rape,19 and felony murder,20 for example. Others were
by nature of the offender-persons with mental retardation, 2'
and offenders who killed when they were young. 22 These efforts
met with mixed success. The second category involved
challenges to the administration of capital punishment on the
particular facts of the case. At the Supreme Court level these
challenges were rather more successful. Once again, for
purposes of this Essay, what matters about them is how factintensive they are. It might well be the case that a very large
proportion of all cases resulting in death sentences are infected
by the kinds of constitutional errors the Supreme Court has
identified in these fact-intensive cases, and yet anti-capital
punishment litigators simply do not have the resources to win
every legally meritorious case.
The pattern of resource-intensive, fact-specific litigation
followed by efforts to obtain a flat rule (followed by a backlash
leading to a return to fact-specific litigation) also characterizes
prison reform litigation. 23 Prison reformers began by winning
lower court decisions holding that the totality of the
circumstances at individual prisons could amount to cruel and

18. Greggv. Ga., 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
19. Coker v. Ga., 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
20. Enmundv. Fla., 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Tison v. Ariz., 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
21. Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
22. Stanfordv. Ky., 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Okla., 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
23. For a relatively optimistic view of prison reform litigation, see Malcolm M. Feeley
& Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts
Reformed America's Prisons (Cambridge U. Press 2000).
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unusual punishment. 24 The cases accumulated to the point that
the Supreme Court did not have to, and never did, deal with a
"totality of the circumstances" case on the merits.25 The "totality
of the circumstances" approach was obviously resourceintensive. As prison populations expanded in the 1970s and
1980s, prison reformers narrowed their focus, seeking a
declaration that double-ceiling-the practice of placing two or
more prisoners in cells designed for a single inmate-was
unconstitutional. Here too, had they succeeded, they would have
replaced a resource-intensive standard with an easily
administrable rule. The Supreme Court rejected the challenges,
though.26
There was a congressional backlash as well. Responding to
concerns that lower federal courts were "micro-managing"
prisons, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act in
1996. For all practical purposes, the statute confined
constitutional challenges to "totality of the circumstances" ones.
Prison reform litigation continues, but it once again takes the
form of litigation aimed at altering the practices at particular
prisons, and resource limitations inevitably restrict the ability of
litigators to achieve broad reforms.27
The NAACP's litigation campaign, and many of its
imitators, sought to advance liberal causes. Conservatives too
came to believe that strategic litigation campaigns might help
their causes. 2 8 Property rights litigators overreached in their
efforts to secure constitutional rules effectively barring
regulatory takings and development exactions, winning victories
that fell short of their goals and forcing their litigation into the

24. See e.g. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aft'd,442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971).
25. The Court endorsed the approach in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), where
the issue before the Court was collateral to the merits.
26. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
27. But cf Johnson v. Cal.,__ U. S.,
124 S. Ct. 1505 (2004) (granting certiorari to
Johnson v. Cal., 321 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2003) (challenging policy of racial segregation in
California's prisons)).
28. Conservative litigation goes back a long way. See Daniel Ernst, Lawyers against
Labor: From Individual Rights to Corporate Liberalism (U. Ill. Press 1995) (describing
litigation by employers against labor unions at the turn of the twentieth century and after).

LITIGATION CAMPAIGNS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RULES

fact-intensive form that always limits what litigation can
accomplish for cause lawyers.29
My final example of the role of rules in strategic litigation
campaigns is the challenge that conservative public interest
litigators mounted against affirmative action. Like other
strategic litigation groups, these litigators did not have large
staffs or financial resources. 30 They carefully selected plaintiffs
who, they believed, would present sympathetic claims. They
hoped to obtain a flat rule effectively barring the consideration
of race in university admissions. Constitutional doctrine, though,
turned out to pose an obstacle to that achievement.
Doctrinally, the anti-affirmative-action litigators sought to
get the courts to declare that the use of race in university
admissions processes was subject to "strict scrutiny." Satisfying
that standard would require universities to demonstrate that racebased admissions processes were extremely well-designed
("closely tailored," in the constitutional jargon) as techniques of
accomplishing
extremely
important
("compelling")
governmental goals. And, the litigators believed, universities
could never make such a demonstration.
Careful reflection on the other major recent strategic
litigation campaign focused on obtaining a favorable doctrinal
structure might have given the anti-affirmative action litigators
pause. Women's rights groups set out to get the courts to declare
that gender-based distinctions in the law were subject to strict
scrutiny. They never quite succeeded, even as they won
Supreme Court victory after Supreme Court victory. Starting
with a minor case in which the Court invalidated a statutory
gender discrimination because it did not satisfy the
31
Constitution's least demanding standard, minimum rationality,
the Court gradually ratcheted up what governments had to do to
justify gender-based discriminations, culminating in the Virginia
Military Institute case, in which the Court held that such
29. See e.g. Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil v. Tahoe Regl. Plan. Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002); Palazzolo v. RI., 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
30. Useful studies of conservative litigating groups include Steven P. Brown, Trumping
Religion: The New ChristianRight, the Free Speech Clause, and the Courts (U. Ala. Press
2002); Clint Bolick, Voucher Wars: Waging the Legal Battle over School Choice (Cato
Inst. 2003); and John P. Heinz, Anthony Paik, and Ann Southworth, Lawyers for
Conservative Causes: Clients, Ideology, and Social Distance, 37 L. & Socy. Rev. 5 (2003).
31. Reedv. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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persuasive
"exceedingly
required
discriminations
32
The Court described this as "skeptical
justification[s]."
33
scrutiny," not quite strict scrutiny but something constitutional
law professors have come to describe as "intermediate" scrutiny.
What is notable about the women's rights litigation
campaign is that it was clearly a massive success even though it
never accomplished what its designers wanted. Indeed, the Court
managed to transform the standard of review from mere
rationality to "skeptical scrutiny" without ever acknowledging
that it was in fact ratcheting up the requirements. 34 A careful
reader of the Court's opinions might have taken the lesson of the
women's rights litigation to be that the standard of review did
not really matter. How it was applied did. The applications of
the various standards the Court articulated in the women's rights
cases were almost uniformly favorable to the strategic litigators.
In the end, the anti-affirmative-action litigators got the
doctrine they favored, but in doing so suffered a substantial
defeat for their overall goals. The Michigan affirmative action
decisions held, as the litigators wanted, that the use of race in
university admissions was indeed subject to strict scrutiny.35 In
the case involving undergraduate admissions, the Court
invalidated a system in which applicants from minority groups
were awarded a fixed number of points towards admission, but
in the case involving law school admissions, the Court upheld a
system in which race was taken into account in what the Court
thought was a sufficiently flexible way, by means of reviews by
admissions officials of the entire file of each applicant.
From the litigators' point of view, this combination of
results amounts to a real defeat. Instead of eliminating all
admissions programs that take race into account, the Court
struck down only those that did so in an unreasonable or
inflexible way. Future challenges to affirmative action programs
32. US. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (quoting Miss. U. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
33. Id. at 531.
34. The key opinion, which was not for the Court, may have been Justice William J.
Brennan's plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), which
demonstrated beyond doubt that the Reed decision, see note 31, supra, actually had already
abandoned the "mere rationality" standard. After Frontiero,just about everyone knew that,
whatever the words, the standard the Court was using was getting increasingly stringent.
35. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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will have to resemble the equalization litigation the NAACP
abandoned; they can take the form only of challenges to
particular programs, on a school-by-school basis, for being
insufficiently flexible. Like the equalization litigation, these
challenges will be resource-intensive, because the challenges
will have to gather substantial information through discovery to
determine exactly how a nominally flexible program is actually
being implemented. Further, a decision striking down a program
at one school will have few implications for programs at other
schools, whose lawyers will certainly be able to point to
differences in flexibility that, they will claim, are sufficient to
distinguish their programs from the invalidated one. The antiaffirmative action litigators are unlikely to have sufficient
resources to make a serious dent in university affirmative action
programs.
My focus on one small facet of the litigation campaign that
culminated in Brown v. Board of Education may seem peculiar
in seemingly failing to appreciate that decision's monumental
importance in twentieth century history and law. In modest selfdefense, I suggest that great decisions are great because they
send their tendrils out in many directions, not all of which are
obvious at the moment they are decided. Brown set a pattern for
later litigation campaigns. Its effort to transform segregation
litigation from a fact-intensive activity into a rule-based one was
repeated by other litigation campaigns. So was the fact that
Brown's success in doing so was followed by a backlash that
reintroduced fact-intensive litigation at a different, but equally
important, stage of the litigation. The lesson to be learned from
this perspective is a small one, perhaps, but I think an important
one.

